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ABSTRACT
A contemporary health care reform is underway, associated with a set of reformers who are active
nationally and locally at the doctor/patient level, the health care institution level, and the policy level.
This reformist energy is associated with processes in law and policy that can be called new governance
and soft law. These processes are different from previous understandings of how health care can be
governed, such as self-regulation, market forces, and new deal command and control regulation. These
processes are taking hold and are visible in the public and private sectors and through out the health care
industry. The paper discusses the relationship between resolving health care conundrums, such as
universal access, eliminating racial and ethnic disparities and embedding information technology, and the
new processes.
There are six innovations that derive from the interaction between new governance, soft law, and
reform processes: alternative sites for deliberation, consumer and patient participation, different roles for
government, redesigned organizational forms, and new tools for regulation and resolving disputes. Each
of these innovations is discussed in the context of the health care reform stories. The paper discusses the
variety of interactions between new governance and the older systems and how they coexist. It describes
three ways in which the older processes are maintained, or could be maintained while utilizing the newer
more effective processes. One type is the dynamic interaction between the old and new, a second is
orchestrating a multi-pronged strategy that incorporates new governance techniques with more traditional
incentives. The third interaction is the integration of traditional legal values, such as transparency,
inclusion, and equity into the new processes.
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INTRODUCTION
A different context in health care is emerging since the failure of the Clinton health plan and the
routinization of managed care. The context displays new technologies, shifts in governmental roles, and
available comparative quality and cost information. This context also includes: evidence based medicine
that allows protocols that standardize care and correct variations in quality; the competitive global
economy which requires cost effective health care for workers; and the fiscal crisis of state and federal
government. However, the context also includes continued insecurity about health care coverage for
employed workers and the uninsured, and increasing evidence of poor quality of care and inequities in
health care treatment.
In the midst of this complex context highly visible health care reformers are evident. These
reformers advocate that change is here, that these changes will be radical, and that these changes will
work. They sense momentum and believe that the tipping point for transformation is in sight. These
reformers are optimistic about resolving the continuing health care problems despite this complex context.
The reformers are working to solve the ongoing health care conundrums. There are three stories that
demonstrate the reform process. The first story is the longstanding challenge of universal access. The
historical inability of the United States to use the international models for universal coverage is well
documented. Over the last ten years an alternative incremental approach is underway. The alternative
approach is based on state based experimentation combined with federal funding and multilevel
interaction. The second story is about brand new technologies that challenge the former system.
Information technology allows complex information to be communicated in a timely and flexible form to
health care professionals. The technology for communication is coming at the same time as an explosion
in the ability to produce evidence based treatment through protocols and standardization. The coming
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together of digital information with evidence-based knowledge presents a great opportunity for improving
quality of health care. However, the barriers of the existing system serve as an impediment to the
embedding of new technologies. The third story is about reducing the health care inequities. The
disparities among racial and ethnic minorities, in health care outcomes, are a longstanding scandal in
American health care. However, with the ability to improve quality through technology innovations and
evidence-based medicine, disparities in health care outcomes could be substantially reduced. This
challenged the conventional belief that anti-discrimination tools are the primary method for eliminating
disparities.
These stories show how the reformers are working to resolve these health care conundrums. As
the stories are analyzed, they demonstrate a set of processes and understandings that are substantially at
variance with previous views about the relationship between professionalism and expertise, and markets
and government regulation. These new processes are facilitating the reformers’ ability to solve health
care problems. The new processes challenge the older beliefs of how governance can work to resolve
health care problems. They also demonstrate a rethinking of how law can enable policy renovations.
The stories show the interaction between the problem to be resolved and the way governance and
law is changing to resolve these problems. The three stories looked at together reveal a set of innovations
that derive from an interaction between the new governance, new forms of law, and reform processes.
These innovations can be seen as enabling a reformed health care system that is both efficient and
equitable. One aspect of the innovations is that while they embody much of the new governance and soft
law elements, they also contain aspects of the earlier self-regulation, command and control/entitlement,
and market incentives that characterize the earlier periods. These innovations are works in progress with
issues of participation in the processes, continuing inequities based on income and education,
commitment to funding, and ensuring the publicness of the policies that are emerging. However, there is
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evidence of varieties of coexistence between the new governance and the older systems that may give
guidance into the potential benefits of the reforms to be both effective and legitimate.
The paper begins with a discussion of the contemporary health care reform that is underway. It
describes the interest in health care reform that is moving to the top of the agenda because of global forces
combined with internal dissatisfaction. This resurgent energy is associated with a set of reformers who
are active nationally and locally at the doctor/patient level, the health care institution level, and the policy
level. The paper describes the three health care conundrums that frame the reform efforts and reveal the
methods that are utilized to resolve these conundrums. The paper then discusses the relationship between
resolving these conundrums by contrasting traditional governance forms with the new mechanisms. The
paper describes the relationship between these new mechanisms that might be called new governance and
soft law. The paper then describes six innovations that derive from the interaction between new
governance, soft law and reform processes: alternative sites, consumer and patient participation, different
roles for government, redesigned organizational forms, and new tools for regulation and resolving
disputes. Each of these innovations is discussed in the context of the health care reform stories. The paper
concludes with a discussion of the variety of interactions between new governance and the older systems.
It describes three ways in which the older processes are maintained, or could be maintained while
utilizing the newer more effective processes. One type is the dynamic interaction between the old and
new, a second is orchestrating a multi-pronged strategy that incorporates new governance techniques with
more traditional incentives, and a third is integrating traditional legal values into the new processes.
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I.

Health Care Reform: Three Stories
82% of Americans rank health care among their top concerns.1 People are satisfied with health

care when they can get it but are afraid they will not be able to secure it. Over 45 million people were
without health insurance during 2003.2 Inadequate health care quality has been well documented.
Compounding the problems is an extremely complicated health care scheme. Health care coverage is
provided through a mixed public, private, and nonprofit system. It delivers services through local
provision with federally controlled programs such as Medicare and through varied benefits provided by
employer-based plans.
These problems in health care must be tackled in a complex context. This context includes the
availability of transformative technology that can radically change the way in which health care is
delivered and accessed. It also includes an interest in shifting power to lower levels of government and
the appreciation of more individual responsibility and involvement. The increasing speed of new medical
research and knowledge, including information about improving care through community and public
health measures, requires a more flexible and responsive system. The competitive world economy is also
straining the employer based health care system. Since a large portion of health care is paid through
employer payers it is inhibiting many firms from competing in this environment.3 Rising costs are also a
major issue straining the fiscal budgets at the state level, due to Medicaid, and at the federal level due to
Medicare.
Like costs, liability is also a background driver. The medical malpractice method of deterring
negligence and redressing patient harms is no longer efficient and equitable. Improved evidence based
medicine combined with the collection and dissemination of data has two effects on malpractice. One, it
1

Paul Krugman, The Health of Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2004, at A23.
U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2003, 14
(August 2004).
3
Daniel Akst, The Hidden Price Tag For Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at BU6
2
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increases the potential for liability because if medical providers have not installed the standards for good
practice their mistakes are more easily revealed. One the other hand, the transparency of errors, and
resulting exposure to malpractice, will drive providers to install quality compliance systems. As the
system for preventing errors becomes effective it will result in the liability of the whole system, rather
than the individual provider.4
Another aspect of the contemporary context is the recent failures of ambitious proposals to
improve the health care system, such as the Clinton health plan and managed care. The Clinton health
plan was an effort to achieve a seamless universal system through an elaborate, federally controlled, allembracing system. The Clinton health plan was defeated in part because it was viewed as an attempt to
replace the existing, diverse, and complex health care system with a mammoth bureaucracy. The failure
is viewed as a vote against centralized, government dominated, bureaucratically controlled governance.5
The experiment with managed care, represented as a managed competition approach to solving the health
care problems, has also reached a plateau. It reached a plateau due to a perceived consumer desire for
choice and the limits of its initial cost savings.
Nonetheless, Stakeholders realize that these problems can and must be tackled, even in this
complex context. Tackling these problems is essential for the U.S. to have a strong, growing economy
and provide excellent high-quality health care for all people. The stakeholder groups that are essential
include physicians, health care providers, business, government, consumers/patients, and technology
experts and entrepreneurs. A set of reformers is emerging from the stakeholders. These reformers range
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William M. Sage, Unfinished Business: How Litigation Relates to Health Care Regulation, 28 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 387, 399 (2003). Medical disciplinary boards have also proved a mixed success
as a way of preventing medical errors and of providing redress for patients. See also the effect on medical
disciplinary boards, Ruth Horowitz, Medical Licensing and Discipline in the United States: Medical,
Legal and Public Discursive Domains (June 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
5
Louise G. Trubek, Health Care and Low-Wage Work in the United States: Linking Local Action for
Expanded Coverage, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN THE NEW ECONOMY 292 (Jonathan Zeitlin
and David M. Trubek, eds., 2003).
7

from former Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson6, physicians such as Donald
Berwick, health lawyers and educators such as Troy Brennan, and consumer leaders such as Ron Pollack.
These reformists are leading in the emergence of new techniques and theories that challenge the older
systems. These techniques and theories allow the reformers to figure out ways to improve health care
within the contemporary context. These insights create energy for change among these reformers, despite
the overwhelming problems in health care. There is an understanding among the reformist stakeholders
that change is essential for the economic and personal health of the nation and that their actions are
creating the basis for that change.
Converting the U.S. health care system to an excellent producer of high-quality care for a
reasonable price is a daunting task. Health care reformers are working at transformation through tackling
certain specific issues. There are three specific conundrums that are particularly important: how to
achieve universal coverage, how to embed technology into health care delivery, and how to attain high
quality care for all. A series of initiatives is emerging from people searching for new ways of resolving
the ongoing problems. The new actors are participating in a series of collaborations and dialogues.
Local, state, and federal governments are working with health care institutions at the policy level, as well
as business and consumer groups. Health care institutions are working together to make changes, such as
developing standardized data collection tools that will work within and across institutions. At the patientprovider level, the interaction is changing from a hierarchical relationship to that of sharing expertise.
Universal Coverage: From a centralized, single system to incrementalism
The lack of universal coverage has long been the most noted deficiency in U.S. health care. The
effects on the uninsured are notable in personal health, the additional costs to the health care system, and
on the economic health of the nation. The lack of insurance in the U.S. results in poor health for those
6

Tommy G. Thompson, Foreword: The State of America’s Health Care System, 31 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 805 (2005).
8

residents who are uninsured. In addition, it results in the shifting of the costs for providing care of the
uninsured onto two sets of payers: the employers, who pay more, due to the medical establishment
shifting their added costs on to them, and the government payers, who are forced to raise taxes in order to
cover their share of uncompensated care. It also affects the economy by encouraging job lock where
employees cannot move to the position that matches their talents because of their fear of losing health
care coverage.
There is now an acknowledged consensus that some form of universal coverage for residents is
essential for the economic and personal health of the U.S.7 This consensus has developed for two reasons:
the acknowledgment by business that universal coverage is crucial for its success and a shift in vision to
one based on an incremental approach. The incremental approach took off in the wake of the Clinton
plan’s failure.8 The critics of the incremental approach assert that the abandonment of the
rights/entitlement model can never achieve the universality that is essential for an effective and efficient
healthcare system. They argue that the fiscal constraints of state government and the elimination of
entitlements that are judicially reviewed will undercut the coverage and that low-income people will once
again lose coverage. However, they admit that the political will for the single-payer, rights/entitlement
route is gone.9 The incremental approach reassures business and providers who fear a government
controlled, one-size-fits-all model for health care. It de-emphasizes the bureaucratic, single set of
universal benefits and administration. Business is getting involved to solve the problem of the uninsured
because it sees that solving the uninsured problem is necessary for their own economic health and the
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The business case for universal coverage is increasingly documented. See e.g., Paul Fronstin, The
“Business Case” for Investing in Employee Health: A Review of the Literature and Employer SelfAssessments, EBRI Issue Brief No. 267 (March 2004).
8
Facing Health Care Tradeoffs: Costs, Risks and the Uninsured, La Follette Policy Report (Robert M.
La Follette Sch. of Pub. Aff., University of Wisconsin-Madison), Winter 2003-04.
9
David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633 (2004). See also
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE
PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE (2003).
9

competitive situation of the U.S. in the world economy. Business groups understand, to the extent they
can no longer afford their own health care programs, other programs to cover their worker will have to be
designed and paid for.10
The incremental approach to universal coverage is proceeding on four tracks: experimenting at the
state level, integrating networks with federal funding, linking public and private coverage, and
incorporating coverage for the uninsured through pooling and incentives. There is now a rich array of
state approaches to providing coverage. In the 2005 budget debate, the National Governors Association
united, across bi-partisan lines, to oppose massive cuts in Medicaid and develop a system for reforming
Medicaid that cut costs while maintaining coverage and improving quality. The Medicaid cuts were
reduced and a high level Medicaid commission is being appointed.11 This commission’s goal is to work
with a variety of stakeholders including state and federal leaders to figure out ways that Medicaid funding
can be more efficiently used to expand access and improve quality. The strength of the governors in the
recent Medicaid debate is based on the state-by- state incremental approach that has been ongoing for the
past several years. State governments are experimenting with various methods trying to figure out ways of
putting the pieces together to achieve greater coverage.12
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In some cases like General Motors profits are falling. See Matt Miller, CEOs Should Force Health Care
Issue, WIS. STATE JOURNAL, May 22, 2005. For Wal-Mart the issue is covering low wage workers. See
Stacy Forster, Big Companies Fill BadgerCare Rolls, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, May 24, 2005, at
A1.
11
Lawmakers Express Anger Over Leavitt Medicaid Commission, Washington Health Policy Week in
Review (The Commonwealth Fund), May 23, 2005
12
A recent study indicated that Medicaid care is equivalent to the access to low income privately insured
adults. This information supports the usefulness of considering options for expanding Medicaid or
expanding coverage for low income people through private plans, perhaps with a government subsidy.
See, Teresa A. Coughlin et al., Assessing Access to Care Under Medicaid: Evidence for the Nation and
Thirteen States, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1074 (2005); State Health Insurance: Making Affordable Coverage
Available To All Americans, FOSTERING RAPED ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE (INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE),
Nov. 2002, at 69.
10

Combining public programs with employer-based coverage is also being proposed through further
expansion of Medicaid and encouraging small business to offer health care coverage through a
combination of tax credits and subsidies from government programs. One approach that the Governors
are endorsing is the development of multistate pharmaceutical purchasing pools for any person who does
not have coverage to pay for pharmaceuticals.13 An additional plan does pool pharmaceutical purchasing
for Medicaid recipients, state employees, and other state public programs within the state.14 The creation
of large pools at the state level can also be used to reduce costs for business by including private
businesses in these large state pools, which were exclusively for state employees.15 In Wisconsin for
example a proposed bi-partisan plan would require all employers to pay into a plan run by a new, private
non-profit corporation. The proposal would include a health savings account and a tiered set of benefits.16
A seamless system linking public and private programs requires horizontal networks within the states and
communities to allow public programs and private employers to communicate and share information on
eligibility. Information technology enables people to move from public plans to private coverage and vice
versa with no loss of coverage when their job and income situation requires.17 States are emphasizing
quality techniques, patient involvement, and community participation to improve care.18 Networks of state
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Press Release, Illinois Office of the Governor, Gov. Blagojevich and Cong. Emanuel joined by
Wisconsin Gov. Doyle in launching I-SaveRx prescription drug importation program; Citizens of IL and
WI now able to purchase Rx drugs from Europe and Canada (Oct. 4, 2004), at
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=3439. See also Gretchen
Ruethling, 5 Drug-Importing States Add 2 Countries as Sources, N.Y. TIMES, at A15.
14
Press Release, Illinois Office of the Governor, Governor announces new Illinois Rx Buying Club
promotional efforts during National Senior Citizens Month (May 2, 2004), at
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=3021.
15
David Callender, Health Plan Would Cover All in State, CAPITAL TIMES, June 15, 2005, at A1
16
Id.
17
Facing Health Care Tradeoffs: Costs, Risks and the Uninsured, La Follette Policy Report (Robert M.
La Follette Sch. of Pub. Aff., University of Wisconsin-Madison), Winter 2003-04. See also State Health
Insurance: Making Affordable Coverage Available To All Americans, FOSTERING RAPED ADVANCES IN
HEALTH CARE (INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE), Nov. 2002, at 69.
18
Frist-Bingaman Bill Would Allow Uninsured Children to Enroll in Medicaid, SCHIP, Washington
Health Policy Week in Review (The Commonwealth Fund), May 23, 2005. The incremental approach is
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government officials, legislators, and governors across states are spreading “best practices” and
encouraging united action to support the programs.19
Embedding Technology: From command and control to national standards and regional
collaboratives
Reformers are pursuing major initiatives to embed technology in the health care system, which has
been a notable laggard. There is a bi-partisan alliance between former Republican Speaker Newt
Gingrich, Representative Patrick Kennedy and Senator Hillary Clinton aimed at overcoming resistances to
the measures necessary to embed technology. The alliance reflects the continued reports20 that describe
how advanced technology could radically transform the quality and reduce the cost of healthcare.
However, there is reluctance in the medical community to invest in technology stemming from high costs,
a perceived loss of autonomy in using their professional expertise, and fear of a centralized data set.21
There is also difficulty in developing a national inter-operable system that provides assurance that privacy
and security are protected.22 The Bush Administration has proposed a national healthcare regional
infrastructure, which will be responsible for coordinating all private sector initiatives into the American
Health Information Community.23 The goal is to create a comprehensive knowledge-based network of
interoperable systems capable of providing information anytime, anywhere. It is, however, not a central
database of medical records. The role of the federal government is to ensure that standards are in place to
based on states combining the resources of the Medicaid program as expanded through the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) funds. SCHIP is an expansion of health care coverage
targeting uninsured children. The federal government, in enacting SCHIP, encouraged states to
experiment with various approaches to insuring children and families with the additional funding.
19
Louise G. Trubek, Health Care and Low-Wage Work in the United States: Linking Local Action for
Expanded Coverage, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN THE NEW ECONOMY 292 (Jonathan Zeitlin
and David M. Trubek, eds., 2003).
20
Information and Communications Technology Infrastructure: A “Paperless” Health Care System,
FOSTERING RAPED ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE (INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE), Nov. 2002, at 57.
21
Newt Gingrich & Patrick Kennedy, Operating in a Vacuum, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2004, at A25.
22
Press Release, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, Questions and
Answers American Health Information Community (June 6, 2005), at
http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/qa.html.
23
Id.
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allow the interoperable systems; the model is the banking information infrastructure. The proposal funds
local demonstration projects based on the concept that local governance facilitates the trust necessary to
realign incentives. The proposal is for “regional” systems that could be smaller or larger than states; it is
coordinated through the Connecting Communities for Better Health, a federally funded program.24 The
AHIC is a forum that includes 17 commissioners representing consumers, privacy interests, states, payers,
providers, vendors, and purchasers.25 The group is “chartered for two years, with the option to renew up
to five years, to be succeeded by a private-sector health information community initiative.”26 While the
federal government is initiating this effort their investment is relatively modest. As the move towards
proceeds there are various elements for the health care information and communication infrastructure.
One of the ongoing debates is the relationship between the electronic health records, which are primarily
considered to be in the domains of the providers, and the personal health records, which are in the control
of the patient. There is also the importance of the access to the electronic medical record system for
public health purposes. The interrelationship between these three dimensions is an ongoing aspect of the
move to the embedding of electronic systems within health care.27

These current efforts build upon the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA). HIPAA delegated power to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
promulgate rules to advance health care technology through uniform standards for electronic transactions,
privacy protections and security of data. The production of the rules relied on the traditional federal

24

Website funded through an agreement with the Health Resources and Services Adminstrative Office for
the Advancement of Telehealth, http://telehealth.hrsa.gov/.
25
Press Release, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, Questions and
Answers American Health Information Community (June 6, 2005), at
http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/qa.html.
26
Id.
27
William W. Stead et al., Achievable Steps Toward Building a National Health Information
Infrastructure in the United States, 12 JAMIA113 (2005).
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Administrative Procedure Act rule-making process and took many years and many hearings to finally
produce pages of rules. The proponents of HIPAA relied on the command and control model. However,
the rules-based system seemingly proposed in HIPAA was never quite the old model. The concept
underlying the need for a standardized system across competing providers and insurers was initiated by a
series of public-private collaborations, known as HIPAA Collaboratives. State-based and local
collaboratives consist of all the stakeholders: business, government, technology experts, and providers
from all types of backgrounds. Since HIPAA has been enacted, these groups have been helping their
members comply with HIPAA by providing information and sharing techniques.28
Guaranteeing Quality and Equity: From anti-discrimination and medical malpractice to quality
assurance tools
The reformers realize that just having health insurance is not enough to guarantee health; the care
must be high quality. Since the late 1990s, reformers from the medical sector and concerned business
purchasers29 have promoted quality as an achievable and necessary goal for the health care system.
Although the U.S. has one of the most expensive health care systems in the world, the quality of care is
mixed. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s National Healthcare Quality Report indicates
that the U.S. system currently does not do enough to prevent diseases, diagnose them early to improve
treatment outcomes, or provide coordinated care to patients with chronic diseases.30 In addition, uneven
quality is particularly noticeable in connection to the disparities of health outcomes of racial and ethnic
minorities. Studies have shown that minority Americans receive less health care and what they do receive
tends to be lower quality care, even controlling for insurance status and income.31

28

Wendy Netter Epstein, Bottoms Up: A Toast to the Success of Health Care Collaboratives, What Can
We Learn?, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 739 (2004).
29
See Leapfrog, http://www.leapfroggroup.org/.
30
National Healthcare Quality Report, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. AND QUALITY at 2-4 (2003),
available at http://qualitytools.ahrq.gov/qualityreport/download_report.aspx.
31
Sidney D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM. L. J. &
MED. 203, 208-9 (2001).
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In response to the documentation of the persistence of health disparities, there is a major initiative
led by reformist health care leaders to adopt a quality-based approach to the provision of health care as an
indirect route to achieving equality. A recent report called “Within Our Reach” indicates “leveraging
existing quality assurance systems to monitor and address disparities could substantially reduce the
disparities in healthcare treatment.”32 If the problems with quality can be resolved, it opens the way not
only to a high-quality health care system, but also a reduction in health disparities. Health care providers
can more easily cope with the controversial subject of health disparities using the quality mantra. Once
providers and payers are committed to the assessment and measuring of quality, they can use these
techniques to access and improve the outcomes for racial and ethnic minorities. There is evidence that
publication of quality indicators can be effective to improve quality for minority populations. A recent
study demonstrated that the quality of care improved for minority populations when public data on the
success of physicians were made available and distributed to minorities.33

II. New Governance and Soft Law
In health care, there is a historical mix of self-regulation, market forces, and government
regulation.34 The health care reforms just described represent a significant change in governance. Rand
Rosenblatt defines this mix as the remains of the three ages of health law: authority of the medical

32

Kevin Fiscella, Within Our Reach: Equality in Health Care Quality, Symposium, Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Health Care Treatment, The Harvard Civil Rights Project (May 18, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
33
Dana B. Mukamel et al., Quality Report Cards, Selection of Cardiac Surgeons, and Racial Disparities:
A Study of the Publication of the New York State Cardiac Surgery Reports, 4 Inquiry 435 (2004-2005).
34
Troyen A. Brennan, The Role of Regulation in Quality Improvement, 76 THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 709
(1998). The argument is that in no substantive area was there ever true self-regulation because there was
always some government action in some way, be it administrative, legislative, or judicial.
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profession, modestly equalitarian social contract and market competition.35 The authoritative period of
the medical profession was characterized by self-regulation and accreditation as the preferred ways to
govern. The second age that Rosenblatt defines as “modest social contract” is sometimes called the “new
deal/great society period.”36 This governance system emphasized command and control based in
Washington DC. The administrative agencies issued periodic rules and emphasized professional expertise
as the source of information and knowledge. There was an emphasis on entitlement programs and a
reliance on individual litigation.37
Since the 1970s, critics of government regulation and the administrative state have called for
alternatives to the new deal/great society model. Rand Rosenblatt defined the period that comprised
privatization, deregulation and reliance on market competition as the third age.38 Managed care is one
manifestation of that period. While managed care succeded in reducing costs, briefly, it engendered a
backlash from physicians and consumers. The widely used phrase was that it “managed costs not care.”
The inability of these tools, and institutions to resolve health care problems is highlighted in the failure of
the Clinton health plan. Rosenblatt describes “President Clinton’s attempt to solve these problems with a
national health insurance proposal that ingeniously combined the social contract, market competition and
professional authority models, but was unable to mobilize the political support to overcome intense
opposition.”39

35

Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155 (2004).
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
37
For an extensive discussion of these issues see, William H. Simon, Solving Problems v. Claiming
Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Liberal Legalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004). In health
care medical malpractice is used to redress negligent errors and civil rights litigation is used to redress
discriminatory behavior were the tools employed.
38
Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155 (2004).
39
Id. at 175.
36
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The health reform stories describe an emerging set of practices that can be called “new
governance” or “post-regulatory”, or “new proceduralism.”40 The appearance of new governance
techniques in health care is an important aspect of the way in which reform is developing as described in
these stories. These new governance techniques are intertwined with the reinvisioning of how to improve
health care. In a recent article one observer posited that these practices can be called a fourth age of
health law.
This fourth age is linked to a more general shift in how governance is evolving. While this paper
describes new governance in health care, other sectors also demonstrate these emerging practices. New
governance is a broader phenomenon and its aspects are shared in these different sectors ranging from
work place safety programming to the environment.41 The word new does not imply that it has been
invented recently; rather it is used to refer to widespread and explicit use of nonconventional forms of
governing.42 New governance is not about privatization—it is post privatization. It is redefining
relationships among government, markets, and individuals. It is not about spending less money but
spending it better. It is not even about less paperwork or less regulation. New governance is a third way
between traditional administrative law and total deregulation. It is about effectiveness and equity. It
restructures relationships among markets, government, professional expertise, and re-opens the age-old
issue of how best to maintain social and environmental values in a market economy. It recognizes that,
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Scott L. Cummings, Political Mobilization in the Post-Regulatory State: Cause Lawyering and the
Community Economic Development movement, Paper Presented at the Lawyers and Social Movements
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while privatization can bring important new tools to help solve problems (like market-based approaches),
“private markets cannot be relied on to give appropriate weight to public interests over private ones
without active public involvement.” 43
New governance includes devolution, public-private partnerships, new types of regulations and
incentives, network creation, coordinated data collection and dissemination, benchmarking, monitoring,
and active individual involvement.44 Devolution means moving power to lower levels of government,
including local and state with less emphasis on nationally administered programs with little flexibility.
There is multilevel interaction where the national government sets standards, or provides funding with a
back and forth relationship between the federal, state and local level. The idea of experimentation is
closely linked to devolution, since the more local an entity is, the easier experimentation becomes. Often,
experimentation occurs outside the realm of regulation or parallel to it.45 Experimentation can also be
seen as similar to continuous quality improvement —organizations should be constantly experimenting to
see what works and what does not.46 There is experimentation with different models of resolving
problems at the state and local level. This experimentation is producing information about what works
and doesn’t work and this information is shared through shareholder networks, such as networks of
government officials and business purchasers. Devolution does not mean there is no role for coordinating
institutions and systems. The local groups, which provide diversity, require some form of orchestration,
either through horizontal sharing or through multi-level feedback. The larger entity takes the information
and experience and distributes it to other like programs. Orchestration is also necessary to ensure that the
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quality of the services provided at the local level is adequate and to prevent a race to the bottom that
occurs with isolated and fragmented local projects.
Another element is public- private partnerships where traditionally isolated organizations and
programs are brought together to work on shared problems, crossing the traditional barriers of diverse
corporate forms and competing constituencies. The knowledge that is employed to work on these
problems is expanded to include users and local context as well as techniques such as information
technology. It is also closely linked to networking: a process of finding out from organizations in the field
what already works or does not work and adapting to this information. The use of networks also changes
the role of government because it no longer regulates or commands organizations to achieve desired
outcomes. While negotiation through networks may be difficult, rules and standards that have been
negotiated by the networks may be better complied with because of the negotiation process.47 Traditional
governance has been skeptical of collaborations between private and public entities. New governance
recognizes that public/private networks have different strengths that can be used in concert to solve public
problems.48 Economic incentives are used as part of the regulatory framework. There is emphasis on
collecting data in order to evaluate whether goals, that are set and benchmarked, are achieved. There is
emphasis on monitoring results through the collection and public dissemination of data that can lead to
iteration and revisions. It can also be used as a basis to create economic incentives for providers by tying
the payment to value. 49
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An analysis of new governance tools and mechanisms reveals a contrasting view of law as it is
traditionally understood.50 New governance is transformative of law in that it challenges what we think of
as law. Guidelines, benchmarks and standards that have no formal sanctions are important elements in
new governance. There is also a development of informal processes to resolve grievances and disputes,
including negotiation and multistepped procedures.51 This can be called soft law. Soft law is an important
component of new governance practices.52 One reason that the new governance practices are attractive is
the inadequacy of traditional regulation and court-based dispute resolution. Hard law can be
characterized as command and control, court based dispute resolution, uniform rules, punitive sanctions,
and court challenges for noncompliance. This hard law approach has proved inadequate in many cases.
First, the use of court challenges to enforce regulations has been ineffective due to the complexity of the
problems seeking to be solved, the lack of fit between the institutional structures that are causing the
failures with the remedies provided by courts, and the recent unwillingness of judges to undertake
massive reforms through court systems.53 The failure of the anti-discrimination paradigm in racial and
ethnic disparities is an example. Another failure of traditional regulation is the use of malpractice
litigation as the major tool to prevent errors and improve quality. The randomness of the cases, the high
cost of litigation, including lawyers’ fees, and the resistance of health care institutions to utilize the
information about failures are all problems with the hard law approach. Finally, there is a famed gap
between the law on the books and the law in action. Uniform rules are not automatically enforced by the
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agencies, nor does enforcement necessarily lead to the desired outcome.54 The perceived inability of the
HIPAA rules to advance the consumer’s interest in health data collection is an example of the gap
between law on the books and effective achievement of the goal.
Soft law allows learning, feedback, non-blaming, encourages multidisciplinary approaches, and
allows government to behave in a different way. It similarly allows other actors to take multiple roles and
allows alliances between traditional adversaries. It also allows economic incentives to be incorporated
into the governance framework while allowing for diversity and experimentation. It allows different
domains, such as public and private agencies, and different regulatory clients, such as public health and
health organization and financing, to interact more easily. “It can encourage mutual cooperation and
exchanges of knowledge and experience through collection, systematization, and diffusion of knowledge.
Soft law can be seen as fostering consensus making and incentives to voluntary learning, as much as by
shaming.”55
This discussion shows how new governance is transformative of traditional law. However, in
assessing new governance it is important to evaluate how these techniques maintain traditional legal
values of inclusion, equity, and participation and transparency. This assessment can be described as the
coexistence of new governance and traditional law. 56 The larger issue is whether this evolving system can
be both popular and effective. The partial failure of managed care and demise of the Clinton health plan
was due to the inability of the reformers to demonstrate that people would be better off and fairly treated
under that governance system. In envisioning this fourth age, it is important to maintain the positive
aspects of the earlier ages, such as a social contract, trust in physicians, and the incentives of market.
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Skeptics of new governance believe that the issues of transparency, fragmentation, unproven success of
new tools, and imbalance of power are major obstacles to the promise of new governance.57
The health care stories demonstrate that in this set of innovations there is an emerging set of soft
law elements that are crucial for new governance. These innovations also include elements of more
traditional legal processes and values. Section three describes these innovations. Section four indicates
how these innovations demonstrate the coexistence of new governance and soft law with the traditional
legal processes and values.
III. Innovations
The older system without some changes cannot deal with the current problems of diversity, new
technologies, increasing flow of new knowledge, and the eroding faith in professionalism. The old
system cannot deal with the increased information that is now available through the combination of
evidence based medicine at the same time as paper records move to electronic. This has created an
explosion for the possibility of new knowledge. This new knowledge depends on feedback and iteration
as the new information is obtained. This feedback requires interaction between domains, for example the
information obtained from the public and private payer must be integrated at the policy and clinical level
for the whole picture to emerge. It also allows for traditional public health to be merged with health care
delivery, for example a physician with ten diabetes patients using the same protocols for treatment can
obtain important information about diabetes treatments that can be shared internally as well as with other
institutions. The use of benchmarking will lead to increased learning. As you improve benchmarking
you learn about additional ways to do a better job. Initially there may be ten benchmarks, but over time
the possibilities will multiply. The older system must be changed to reorient to a new productive system.
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The combination of linking information technology with evidence based medicine, new roles for the
actors, and aligning incentives can lead to path redesign and path innovation.58
The innovations that are being created to accomplish these goals are the key elements of new
governance in health care. The first is alternative sites that create stakeholder locations for interaction
and implementation of programs and projects. The second innovation is the enhanced role of
consumer/patient participation. Part of the inability of the older systems to adapt to the current context is
the difficulty of figuring out how to integrate the essential knowledge of patients/consumers into the
decision-making. The role of government changes becoming more of a set of functions that can be
employed differently depending on the specific problem to be resolved. The role of private organizations
shifts as well. The traditional distinction between public and private law becomes less effective as the
government allows more economic and market incentives to play a role and as private corporations take
on a more social function. While the innovations often result in larger units, such as public/private
pooling, it also encourages development of smaller units, such as local clinics that can deliver care
specific for the cultural and geographical needs of the community. Similarly, the traditional court based
dispute resolution systems may be ill-suited for some of the revisability and learning aspects of new
governance. However, redress for the individual is essential for the legitimacy of the processes. Dispute
resolution systems that use “alternative forms of victim compensation through administrative processes
similar to workers compensation and conflict avoidance through informal methods to explain and
apologize for error.”59 Finally, the new governance system uses information as a regulatory technique
through the publication of data on physician’s results, fiscal incentives for good performance by hospitals
and clinics, and government rules that allow diverse ways of achieving positive outcomes.
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A. Alternative Sites for Deliberation and Implementation
The failures of the late 1980s and the 1990s emboldened key stakeholders to overcome traditional
animosities and self-interests and design new locations for experimentation in providing and paying for
health care. The traditional arenas that brought together actors to debate, deliberate, and resolve problems
were the administrative agency rulemaking process, the courts, markets, and self-regulation. However,
none of these things seemed to work because: there were missing stakeholders, locations were inflexible,
experimentation and diversity were difficult to achieve, enforcement relied heavily on sanctioning and the
available new technology could not be integrated into the existing systems.
Reformers are creating new sites that encourage the collaboration that had been previously
difficult to achieve. The most common sites are collaboratives that consist of a variety of stakeholders
that convene to solve health care conundrums. Examples of these new sites are quality collaboratives,
local technology groups, and groups planning to pool public and private coverage systems.60 These
collaboratives are at the local level, statewide and there are national groups such as the National
Committee for Quality Assurance and the National Quality Forum.61 The collaboratives allow for
networking and rapid changes. The founders of the collaboratives realize that bringing varied expertise
and broad experiences to the collective governance structure is essential.62 Participating at these sites are
the health care actors—providers, consumers, government, and employers, although the role for
consumers in many of these collaboratives is lacking.63 Each actor has important information that, when
shared with all stakeholders, improves the understanding of and the ability to address a problem.64 These
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new collaborations may decide to bring in more organizations or have local pilot projects to see what
works. This exploration leads to something different and perhaps more ambitious than what they started
out with.
Four sets of reformers are now emerging as proponents and leaders of alternative approaches to
solve the health care conundrums through these new collaborations: the pioneering physician, the
concerned payor, the active consumer, and the facilitating government leader.65 Each reformer
participates in various networks, alliances, and forums in order to solve health policy problems. Each
participant has a constituency that must accept working with the new alliances. These leaders must also
change the culture of their constituency so the entire group accepts the value of collaboration and views it
as a way to achieve their own goals.
The role of physicians is crucial in order for new governance in health care to be successful.
Historically, professionalism was a way for physicians to mediate between the tensions of a market-driven
approach to health care and the alternative of government regulation. Professional values and institutions
have been viewed as necessary in order for physicians to maintain an independent role between the
market and regulation. This worked successfully for physicians for a period of time. However, business
and consumer advocates complained that physician control was resulting in higher costs, lack of access,
and inconsistent quality of care. The managed care revolution in the 1980s, businesses’ attempt to create
a competitive market, drastically undermined these traditional professional institutions and controls and
damaged physicians overall leadership. The recent backlash against managed care, created in part by the
actions of health care providers, has emboldened them to once again assert their leadership role. The
managed care backlash came about in part by an alliance, between physicians and consumers, to fight the
intrusion of the “outsiders” into the physician-patient relationship. Although physicians won this battle,
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managed care had changed the environment in which they practice through the development of large
integrated hospital and clinic systems where most physicians now practice, the creation of evidence-based
medicine, and increased reliance on allied health care professionals. As one observer noted, “…
physicians are weakened but not vanquished.”66 In attempting to reassert their leadership role, physicians
noted the effectiveness of business leaders in advancing quality in health care through the use of
networks. They now emulate these network collaborations by working with a wide variety of
stakeholders.
Although physicians are asserting a new role, the concerned employer-payer, who emerged in the
1980s to control health care costs, is still active and prominent. Since provision of health care coverage in
the United States is significantly through the workplace, employers wanted to control health care costs
because they are a major factor in their profitability and sustainability. The pressures of the global
economy require businesses to engage in global arenas that are not integrated into traditional sites.
National competitiveness is being threatened by health care costs. Some large companies can no longer
pay for health care for their workers through their revenues. Entrepreneurial companies cannot pay for
health care as they “start up.” This is why business leaders have joined the consensus for universal
coverage. Alternative sites may encourage business reformers to launch the effort for universal coverage.
In addition to the access problem, employers have expanded their activities to improving quality and even
becoming active in solving the problem of the uninsured.67 The leading voice of business in health care is
the Leapfrog Group, a consortium of more than 100 large employers that have mobilized to use their
purchasing power to affect the health care system. The Leapfrog Group, while national, has substantial
influence on business actions at the state and local level. It exerts a major external force on the internal
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workings of health care institutions and professional groups through the production and dissemination of
benchmarks on the quality and cost of health care procedures.68
These evolving collaborations, while often effective, face challenges. First, there are internal and
external mechanisms that have to be refined in order for the process to achieve its goal. There is also a
reliance on regionalism, a level of government that has been of mixed success in the United States.
Finally, the “publicness” of these collaboratives is often insufficient.
There are internal mechanisms that affect the potential success of these collaboratives.69 The first
is the internal interests of the stakeholder. For instance, physicians are not a monolithic group. Surgeons,
and pediatricians may be threatened by some quality standards in different ways.70 Small businesses have
different interests and power than the Fortune 500 companies. And the success of the collaborative may
depend on who within the organization is participating and their relationship to their constituency. For
example, the participation of the head of a stakeholder organization may provide certain kinds of
authority, but if the head of the organization can’t sell the collaboration to the rest of the organization the
goals of the collaborative may be undermined. These collaboratives contain internal costs that must be
weighed against the benefits. These costs include the time of the stakeholders invested in lengthy
meetings and interactions. The costs also include the dollars required to maintain an ongoing organization
and to pay for staff. Finally, the process may be slow limiting flexibility, which is the raison d’etre of
such collaboratives.71
The external mechanisms that affect the success of the collaboration are the transparency of
collaboratives, dampening of potential innovation by fears of liability and existing inflexible regulations,
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and the absence of unorganized constituencies. State and federal administrative procedure acts and open
records and open meetings laws do not apply to many of these collaboratives because they are not
organized as public bodies. This makes the availability of information about their activities difficult to
find and makes their work seem suspicious. One example to the contrary is the newly created American
Health Information Community (AHIC), which provides a collaborative to accelerate the application of
health information technology. The collaborative developed by the Department of Health and Human
Services is specifically organized under the framework of the Federal Advisory Committee Act in order to
allow for open public meetings and “widespread stakeholder participation in which everyone has a
voice.”72 In addition, fears of litigation based on malpractice may also be an obstacle to the development
and implementation of innovative techniques. Substantive government regulations that do not allow for
innovative systems, such as payment for quality, are also external checks on the effectiveness of
collaborations. A third external barrier is the difficulty of participation by patients and consumers who
have traditionally had difficulty organizing due to their diverse income, race, ethnicity, gender, and
geography.73
Regional groups are also mooted. In President Bush’s proposals for disseminating new technology
in health care74 and in the Medicare Modernization Act,75 there is a commitment to regionalism, described
as below the Washington level but not necessarily at the state level. This is consistent with the academic
discussion about “new regionalism” and “new localism.”76 Scholars note that in order to achieve the
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values of local autonomy there needs to be a legal regime that encourages local participation; limiting
centralized power is not enough to create greater diversity and participation. Some of the proposals now
available cross states but are not geographically contiguous. Prescription drug pools for example now
cross state lines. One example is the I-Save Rx plan where five states, that are not contiguous, are
developing a shared pool to purchase drugs for a lower cost.77 The states locations range from the
Midwest to the East. The efficiency of this type of pooling comes from the ability to use one purchasing
system to buy in bulk internationally and deliver the drugs via mail.
One striking aspect of the collaboratives is the interaction of public and private law that can be
seen in the emerging public/private partnerships. These collaboratives have various organizational forms
that allow them to have flexibility that can come from private interactions. What is needed is that all of
these sites have some form of “publicness.” Getting public and private interaction is not easy because
efficiency and legitimacy are both needed. One obstacle to getting the interaction right is the lack of
coordination between public law and private law. Public law is embodied in administrative law and
procedure. Private law is contract, tort and property. Each domain has a separate robust history, expertise,
and skills. However, if these emerging private partnerships are to work they must be composed of aspects
of both. One model would be through contract where the contract is with a public agency and where the
services provided are subject to open meetings and open records requirements.78 Another technique would
be the monitoring of standards for these alternative sites by a credible organization.79 It is probably best to
have a period of experimentation for various models of “publicness” accomplished through sharing
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models designed to exchange experiences and evaluated for effectiveness.80 The debate over the
ownership of health data between the providers and the consumers is one example where various models
are proposed. The second issue is who controls the availability and use of the data. 81
B. Consumer and Patient Participation
One distinctive feature of new governance practices is the increasing and changing role of the
patient and consumer. The patient and consumer are envisioned as independent actors who can influence
outcomes at the clinical and policy level. The development of economic incentives such as co-pays and
positive economic incentives are methods of the individual using their market power to improve quality of
health care. There is also the use of public information based on data that enable the consumer to make
choices that will both improve the quality of their care and the entire system. These economic and
information incentives can also be combined with methods of delivery that encourage the patient to
participate in the management of their own care, particularly with connection to chronic illnesses. There
is also a emphasis on consumer participation in the collaborative sites. Since the consumers are
considered essential to the functioning health care improvement processes, the voice of consumers and
patients is essential for the deliberations. The voices of the consumers and patients can be provided
through groups of consumer, such as disease groups, and lawyers who represent disadvantaged groups,
including racial and ethnic minorities.
In earlier periods the physician was relied on as the trusted agent for the patient since the
physician was the source of knowledge. Physicians were also the major reformers of the health care
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system during the early 20th century.82 During the great society period, consumers and patients
participated in deliberation through public interest lawyer advocacy at the administrative agency, social
movements at the legislative level, collective bargaining with employers, and litigation against
discrimination and malpractice.83 In the market model that emerged in the 1990s the consumers were
sometimes viewed as creating costs unrelated to necessary care and were encouraged to join managed
care organizations where the decisions on the type and quantity of care were made by management.
The rise of consumers as key players in health care is related to both the use of markets in health
care as one tool of controlling costs, and the rise in chronic diseases that must be controlled by the
patient’s own involvement. Another aspect of the role of the patient is the increasing role of consumer
driven purchasing, particularly health savings accounts.84 Therefore, two consumer roles are important in
health care: the role of the purchaser of healthcare services and that of the patient active in their own
health care. After managed care, employer purchasers realize that more allies are needed to develop and
implement any new healthcare system design. They view a strong consumer role as essential to any
sustainable changes to the system. They also believe that giving consumers a greater voice in the
purchase and delivery of health care is essential to creating a cost-effective and high quality system. The
interface of the longstanding patient rights vision with the newer patient empowerment movement opened
the path to a more active role for patients/consumers in the level of clinical and institutional decision
making.85 The initial move toward public disclosure, while led by business groups, now has the strong
endorsement of traditional consumer groups such as Consumers Union. Consumers Union has created a
campaign called “Stop Hospital Infection” to “…help consumers get the best quality of care by promoting
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public disclosure of hospital infection rates...Consumers and employers can select the safest hospitals and
competition among the hospitals will quickly force the worst to improve.” Consumers Union is endorsing
the passage of legislation to require the infection rates be made public.86 The emphasis on patient selfmanagement has decentered the physicians and lawyers.
The new governance legal forms also require a revised role for lawyers. The new governance
processes incorporate all the stakeholders in order to develop a system that acknowledges and utilizes
diverse knowledge. Lawyers therefore can participate by representing their constituency and by
developing processes and programs that work to improve the system. One example of a different role for
lawyers is the quality approach to reducing disparities. The civil rights litigation approach embodied in
the Title VI and HHS enforcement model were based on the lawyer as the adversarial advocate for the
patient. In the quality assurance approach, the lawyer’s role would no longer be as an advocate for the
individual or institutions alleging discrimination by health care providers and payers. It would decenter
the court as the main arena for redressing the harm that came from discriminatory conduct. The major
emphasis is placed rather on reforming internal health care systems through a combination of creating
incentives for positive outcomes and evidence-based medicine. Employees and government payers would
tie payment to quality outcomes, including compliance with outcomes that have a significant affect on
preventing disparities. Examples of such outcomes are good prenatal care, normal birth-weight babies,
and proven chronic care management. The civil rights model, therefore, which is based on an adversarial
lawyer and court complex would no longer be the dominant model. The performance of physicians and
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the medical institutions, combined with carefully developed guidelines and benchmarks, would be the
tools for reducing disparities.
A concern about new lawyer roles is uncertainty about who will be the advocates for
disadvantaged groups. While educated individual patients can be effective at the patient-physician level,
representatives of the interests of the disadvantaged groups are essential at the institutional and policy
level. The move to consumer-driven health care contains the idea that consumers and patients, if they are
provided information or economic incentives, can influences the system as well as obtain better, less
expensive care. The advocate’s role in assisting patients to participate can tie into the important work
done on negotiation and dispute resolution. The personal health record is one tool that is being promoted
as a way for consumers to be in control, particularly in relation to their physician and health care
institution. 87 These exercises teach the patient to operate on the patient/client, institutional, and policy
levels.88 However, while this is partially true, as seen in the influence of physician information on
consumer choice, there are substantial difficulties. The information is often flawed and many assert that
the data is far from reliable. Many people cannot deal with the overwhelming number of choices. One
example is the difficulties with the Medicare plan for pharmaceuticals, which is failing because of
excessive information. People often need information tailored to their own health history; people with
chronic disease may need assistance in locating information on what programs provide intensive disease
management. On the institutional and policy level, the knowledge required for intervention is often
sophisticated and requires skills such as accessing institutional policies, locating statutes and court cases,
and discovering the places where intervention will be useful. These advocates for disadvantaged groups
can be lawyers or reformist physicians committed to an all-inclusive health care system. These advocates
play the role of assuring that barriers to access are removed; for example, ensuring the collection of data
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on the number and characteristics of the uninsured that is reliable for program and policy development.89
These advocates may also play an important role in diffusing the liability debate that is a barrier to
implementing the new quality tools. They could advocate for the creation of monitoring institutions that
assure that abusive and negligent behavior is prevented or sanctioned.90
C. Disaggregated but Necessary: The Role of Government
The new deal view of government as the controlling, commanding presence is no longer
accurate.91 That view imagined that the social dimension of government should primarily be directed from
Washington through national legislation implemented through administrative agencies issuing uniform
regulations. State and local governments while still involved had a subordinate role. In the 1980s, with
the move towards confidence in market based incentives, as the means to provide health care
improvement, the confidence in external government regulation declined. There was also a belief in the
return to the internal self-regulation model of the early 20th century.92 However, in the recent discussions
about new governance, the role of government is seen as necessary, even though it may no longer be the
authoritative directing agency, as envisioned in the traditional command and control model.93
Traditionally the government’s primary role has been fiscal, through the public budgetary process.94
Through its fiscal capacity the State can align various private players with public policy goals. It can use
this power to play disaggregated roles: enactor of innovative regulation, crucial funder, active monitor,
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final sanctioner, orchestrator, and the justifier of programs. They are necessary for ultimate sanctioning,
as sources of funding, and accountability for fair and equitable processes. Their participation in the
collaboratives for example is essential to ensure that health care services, even if privatized, are fair,
equitable, and effective. The government assumes a coordinating role in the implementation of health
care services and organizes activities so that each actor can do whatever it does best. The various ways in
which government can be involved includes facilitating collaboration, monitoring programs for
effectiveness, collecting data, using regulation and funding to assure quality, correcting imbalances in
participation, as when low-income patients and small businesses find it difficult to participate, and
through sanctioning in order to ensure that actors participate in good faith.

D. New Corporate Forms
There is also a change in the governance of hospitals that is related to the increasing pressures for
hospitals to be able to deliver quality care in a cost efficient manner. The existing governance structures
cannot cope with pressures such as pay for performance regulations, benchmarking for quality care, and
embedding technology. Hospitals are considering reorienting their systems in order to be able to
successfully deal with these external pressures. Examples of what the hospitals are considering are:
coordinating among other health care organizations, using internal regulatory systems such as ISO 9000,
which are more industry based than professionally based, placing more responsibilities on boards of
directors to ensure that physician groups and management are meeting the public goals, such as
investment in information technology, and assuming a greater assumption of liability as a systems
approach undercuts the single professional as the sole actor with exposure to liability.95 As hospitals and
clinics become larger integrated systems there is also a move towards standardization of benchmarks to be
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received and improved internal communication. This results in the lawyers and compliance people
needing to agree on systems in order for the information to be produced over the entire range of
institutions and people responsible for institutions. Thus we see a crossing over between all institutions
that are necessary to demonstrate value for the compensation to be paid. Thus the governing system
requires more collaboration and interaction and undercuts the board of directors in a single institution. An
example is lawyers and compliance professionals needing to work together to develop standards.96 What
is emerging in new governance is a blurring of the boundaries among for–profit institutions, large health
care nonprofit organizations, and community-based agencies. The new collaborative sites include
multiple actors from different organizational structures. These collaborations can orchestrate new ways of
delivering health services and improve quality of services. The tools that can be used are: learning from
each other, sharing of data, and the dissemination of peer benchmarks. In this process, there is a
reconsideration of the traditional legal forms.
One example is the reassessing of nonprofit hospitals as a source of assistance and funding for
expansion of access. There have been longstanding charity care pools that exist in many states that serve
as sources of funding to meet the health care costs of uninsured people. These programs have been
routinely criticized by advocates as being insufficiently integrated with the health care delivery system
and with the individual needs of clients.97 There is also a charitable requirement for nonprofit hospitals.
This requirement has been poorly monitored by the government and insufficiently integrated with the
health care needs of the uninsured. Recently class action lawsuits are being filed across the country
against hospitals for their failure to provide services to the uninsured. These lawsuits, while largely
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unsuccessful up to now, have forced hospitals to consider how they link their service to the uninsured to
their organizational status and to their community outreach. 98
In Utah, the Governor is integrating hospital’s charitable programs into the Medicaid program.
This represents an example of public-private integration and orchestration discussed earlier, but it also is a
redesign of the corporate form, where the state’s interest is expressed, not only thorough the corporate
non-profit law and the attorney generals authority to intervene in charities, but a way of the government
directly working with the boards of directors in a common mission. The push by the federal government
to fund community based health centers is based on their excellent record of providing equitable, quality
care for poor and marginalized groups. Their services can be put together with large for-profits insurers
and large nonprofit hospitals and clinics as part of a large amount of funding that will be administered by
the groups. This allows for a variety of groups to do what they do best and also allow for structural
monitoring and review from the dollars in the “deal.”99
E. Alternative Dispute Resolution
The disillusion with traditional litigation has been ongoing for several decades. The high costs,
unequal access to lawyers, and poor fit between the social problem and the results of the litigation has
engendered a series of proposed reforms. These proposed reforms move towards new types of redress,
reduced use of lawyers, and improved health care outcomes.
Two additional types of dispute resolution are emerging as part of changing governance. The first
is independent external review, a dispute resolution system for health care contract claims. The system
developed out of dissatisfaction with the managed care system and is a way of reasserting physician peer
review and curbing excesses in cost containment. The system, now enacted in almost all the States, is
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primarily a paper review and almost eliminates lawyers from the system. The external review process is
created through legislation but it is administered by private organizations certified by the state. These
external review organizations use peer reviewers with very specific knowledge about the subject of the
complaint. As one scholar notes “ they have a structural hybridity, a discursive marbling of demands for
democratic control over profit-driven health care services together with calls for responsiveness to
medical expertise…. It is a renegotiation of the roles of government, not a simple contraction or
expansion.”100 There is also a relationship between the complaint and improvement in the quality of the
healthcare plan. The information about the complaint and the outcome is in the state agency and can be
accessed by the agency. Public disclosure of the complaints and there resolution is important component
to encourage systemic changes within the health care plan.101
A second type of dispute resolution system that is emerging is a version of restorative justice. The
traditional command and control regulatory system relies on inspection, regulation, and sanctions. For
many health care facilities that are financed through government payments, there is a narrow range of
financial viability. The use of fines as deterrence is not viable since the facilities, particularly nursing
homes, are barely making it, and a failure will leave the state with the burden of relocating residents.
Thus, as the push for high quality nursing homes continues, there is a need to come up with other means
of correcting poor quality that does not involve heavy fining. One approach that is being discussed is to
use the restorative justice model, often associated with the criminal justice system. The family members,
residents and if possible community and advocacy groups meet together to discuss the problem and come

100

Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Process: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, at
http://ssrn.com/abstract+630482.
101
Id.
38

up with a plan for improvement. This is a first step prior to the institution of the traditional regulatory
sanctions.102
F. New Regulatory Tools
Another set of tools might be described as “hitting the physicians and hospitals in their wallets and
their egos.” However, these tools also include incentives for internal systems where the public
information that is now provided and the incentives for reimbursement tied to achieving outcomes also
includes tools which encourage health care organizations to develop their own ways of providing this
information. These three regulatory tools can be called: public information, financial incentives tied to
efficiency, and regulations that allow the institutions to develop their own diverse ways of successfully
meeting the standards.
There is widespread development of data about outcomes and commitment to protocols.
Participation by the physicians and the other health care professionals is required in the development of
the standards and the benchmarks for credibility. This information is sometimes collected by clinic, by
hospital, and by physician. This information is often posted and accessible to all via the internet. These
tools are different than the traditional regulation. Instead of rigid requirements issued after great debate,
but often not revisited for many years, these systems are designed to be constantly updated and reviewed.
The incentives are ongoing. There also are incentives for the system to be set up to achieve the goals of
quality and access. They encourage teamwork within the organization since their outcomes are measured
rather than compliance with specific numbers, such as the number of nurses on the floor. This
information can affect performance through shaming and motivates the institutions to develop systems
that obtain results. By gathering data and updating results on a regular basis, there is a constant
reinforcement to the improving performance. Another approach to improving performance is to align the
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incentives by tying financial payments to quality. 103 One commentator recently noted that “value for
dollar” is now the game in health care.104
A third approach can be called management-based regulation. Management-based regulation is a
mechanism that “directs regulated entities to engage in planning processes, that are self determined, to
meet a particular public goal.”105 Unlike technology-based regulations, that intervene at the action stage of
organizational behavior, and performance-based regulation, management-based regulation is focused on
planning.106 Here again Medicare is taking the lead in their quality assessment and performance program
to reduce medical errors, which is part of the broader Medicare conditions of participation. It is a
planning model that is designed to allow hospital flexibility in designing programs.107
Medicare has recently heavily invested in collecting quality data and publicly disseminating the
information. They have also been active in encouraging groups of stakeholders to develop the benchmarks
and indicators that are used for the comparisons. There is still an ongoing debate about how effective
economic incentives and public data dissemination are in motivating providers. Should the data be used
to encourage internal systems reform by sharing the data exclusively within the organization, such as
hospitals and physician practices. An alternative approach would be to publicly publish the data by
individual hospital or physician to encourage consumer choice. The proponents of the public
dissemination see that option as “a social movement wrapped in a business model.”108 There is also an
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issue of publicness of the process of data collection and dissemination. If the collaborative sites that are
producing and dissemination the information are not adequately transparent the process could become
insular and self-protective. One commentator has said that the control of the data and its dissemination
requires adequate public oversight; otherwise our democracy has become a “banana republic.”109

IV.

Coexistance: Dynamic Between Old and New, Orchestrating Multi-pronged
Strategies, and Integrating Legal Values

The question is whether the innovations that are emerging can reform health care while assuring
participation, fairness, equity and accountability. There is also the question as to the effectiveness of new
governance and soft law to relate to the existing complex regulatory system. These three stories about
resolving health care problems are descriptions of works in progress and as one observer noted, “we are
still torn between the old and the new.” 110 These innovations can be seen as providing some answers to
the critiques. These innovations share certain attributes. The first in incrementalism, that is they proceed
from bottom up while incorporating an understanding of the larger change. Thus, they require multilevel
interactions that are ongoing between the bottom and the top. Second, they reflect shared expertise
between the professionals, the community, and the patient/consumer. This type of networking can also be
seen in the melding of public and private entities and the crossing between traditional administrative and
corporate law. The networks and new knowledge also allow interaction between sectors, such as health
care research and public health. The role of government therefore in this governance regime is also
109

John Chapin, Health Data in a Banana Republic (Jan. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
110
Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155 (2004).
41

multifaceted and plays a role using various techniques to perform various disaggregated functions. This
also results in the use of new procedures not based on the traditional legal methods. Finally, there is
extensive use of data collection that can be the basis for public visibility and for the use of economic
incentives.
There are three examples of coexistence between old governance/hard law and new governance
and soft law. The first is dealing with medical error, where old and new models coexist as alternatives
and potentially as rivals. The second is where a government agency takes on the whole range of new
governance techniques and employs them as part of their regulatory and funding functions. The
outstanding example of this is the Medicare program of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
The third route is the integration of traditional legal values as part of the new governance approaches.
These include the incorporation of monitoring to ensure participation, with special attention to
disadvantaged groups, assuring commitment to eliminating discrimination through maintenance of equal
protection, and linking the right to health care to the achievement of a robust economy.
A. Dynamic Between Old and New
Coexistence between new governance and soft law and the traditional hard law can occur through
a dynamic rivalry. One example of the interrelationship between the two is the effort to move from the
traditional medical malpractice and administrative sanctioning of physicians to a systemic increase in
quality.111 The old governance system relied on medical malpractice and administrative physician
sanctioning to guarantee quality and compensate injured parties. However, the existing malpractice legal
structure is now a barrier to the development of a new framework that gets physician buy-in, adequately
compensates patients for poor medical outcomes and creates systemic processes to avoid medical errors.
There is widespread agreement that the malpractice litigation system fails to compensate injured parties
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and to deter future negligence. Proponents of the quality assurance system assert that it will do a better job
of deterring negligent behavior as well as preventing unnecessary errors. However, there is not yet a
consensus as to how to compensate patients who are injured through negligent or non-negligent
behaviors. Many alternatives on how to compensate patients who are injured have been proffered: nofault insurance, enterprise liability or new types of redress such as medical courts or arbitration.112

B. Orchestrating Multi-pronged Strategies
In some cases there is coexistence between a traditional government agency and new governance
techniques. They are yolked in a multi-pronged strategy that deals with complex problems. Orchestration
is one example of a multi-pronged strategy. Orchestration uses new governance techniques to integrate
new knowledge, encourage innovation, and allow for diversity. The government agency, however, relies
on its traditional regulatory and funding roles to provide baseline incentives for participation in the new
governance processes.113
The role of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is a dramatic example. CMS is
embarking on a multi-pronged strategy to improve quality and contain costs using new governance
techniques for Medicare. It is currently funding pay for performance pilot projects throughout the country
that may be the basis for future widespread use.114 The pay for performance criteria will be used as a
condition of participation for hospitals seeking to receive Medicare reimbursements. They are creating
forums for deliberation and action for quality improvement. For example, the Hospital Quality Alliance
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is a public-private partnership designed to produce published consumer information coupled with health
care quality improvement.115 CMS recently required the submission of hospital quality data as a
condition of compliance in order to receive Medicare funding.116 This data is now displayed on a website.
They have initiated other substantial publication of consumer information starting with comparative
nursing home quality indicators.117 CMS initiated a discussion among many stakeholders on how
Medicare information can be used by beneficiaries in medical health records. It is one of several initiates
put forth in response to “President Bush’s call for Americans to access their health records electronically
within ten years.”118
C. Integrating Legal Values
The new deal/great society model for governance emphasized the need for universal “rights,”
based on constitutional or statutory law. The function of rights can be seen as coexisting with new
governance modes. This coexistence can be seen in the way traditional legal values must be maintained
in order for new governance to be effective and legitimate. Three approaches to health care reflect the
coexistence of these new governance techniques with legal values: inclusion in universal access, equity in
health care treatment, and participation and transparency in health care decision making.
1. Inclusion
The long-standing battle for a “right to health care” underlies many of the campaigns for universal
provision of health care coverage. The failure to achieve a constitutional right was a major disappointment
of the 1960s and 1970s “war on poverty.” More recently, the entitlement to Medicaid coverage, a partial
type of “right,” was seriously threatened in a Congressional battle and many of the new programs do not
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have entitlements.119 The elimination of the entitlement status of the major welfare program for poor
people—Aidfor Dependent Children (AFDC) —was a tremendous blow for the progressives who, since
the new deal, had dreamed of the adoption of the European “social citizenship” model.120 The
maintenance of the entitlement to Medicaid is a continual battle. The battle over entitlements, coupled
with the Clinton plan failure, undermined the progressive belief that an entitlement/rights approach was a
likely route to universal coverage. Constitutional approaches have proved ineffective and recent court
decisions have further undermined the court-constitutional approach.
What is needed is a conceptualization of the relationship between hard law entitlements with soft
law techniques such as experimental expansions of coverage and linking private employer based
programs with public coverage.121 Universal programs are necessary; the more a program is just for the
poor the more it is likely to be cut. The merger of public and private programs is a way of achieving
universal coverage where the poor will not be targets of inadequate funding and poor quality.
In the access area, the importance of a commitment to universality continues. Recent proposals have
indicated a wider base of support among business and conservative legislators for universal coverage
based on the “business case.” Some type of “hard law” commitment may be a necessity to keep the
attention on the importance of universality. But, a “right” is not sufficient if there is inadequate care and
excessive patient payment contribution.122 Realizing this coexistence is not easy. Recent state battles over
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maintaining Medicaid expansion programs have demonstrated the conflict between court mandates and
the more flexible non-entitlement approaches.123 If the standards are not enforceable, there will be a
tendency to cut back when funding is tight. The recent budget battles have demonstrated a strong
commitment to expanded health care by Governors on a bi-partisan basis. But the fragility of the
expanded programs demonstrate that a combination of diverse state programs, that merge public and
private coverage, has to be incorporated into a framework that allows for court and public scrutiny.
2. Equity
There are major initiatives underway to reduce disparities in race and ethnicity, but the role of
rights is decentered in the new approaches. There is reliance instead on quality tools such as
benchmarking, nationally accepted protocols for best practice, and patient self-management to eliminate
disparities. Preliminary results show that these processes may be effective in reducing racial disparities.
The move to using the “law of quality compliance” includes soft law instruments such as benchmarking,
data collection, and reporting.124 However, the “law of civil rights” can be combined with the “law of
quality compliance.” The quality compliance techniques require collection of data and a commitment by
the providers and institutions to collect, examine and utilize the data. It also requires a sharing of
information across local groups and at the state and national level. Community and patient participation in
the system for quality are required for the protocols to be successful. In order for there to be confidence
that the standards and protocols are being followed, there must be an ability to monitor the work of the
institutions, such as hospitals and clinics. The civil rights community has maintained an interest in health
care and the potential for legal remedies remains. Their role can include ensuring that public data
dissemination is available and usable by outside groups. Specific monitoring systems can be set up, at the
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community level, the state level, the self-regulatory body level, or the national level. Without these checks
it is difficult to monitor that the techniques are in place and effective. Once it has been shown that the use
of new governance techniques can have positive results, it may be possible to use litigation to create
pressure on health care providers to adopt the new processes. In that way, the simultaneous presence of
anti-discrimination law and new quality improvement processes may make possible progress not
previously achievable.

3. Participation and Transparency
If important and affected groups are left out of the process, it is likely to lose legitimacy. This may
mean that special efforts must be me made to ensure participation of underorganized and
underrepresented groups, and to be sure well organized groups see it in their interest to participate. One
approach to ensure participation is providing a system for explicit measurement of the participation of
disadvantaged groups in these new sites.125 This requires guidelines for participation and monitoring to
ensure that the guidelines are being met. Another approach is to provide a process where groups who
view themselves as excluded from the process can challenge the transparency and effectiveness of the
governance scheme. A final approach would be to develop a process where actors who are refusing to
collaborate in these new alliances are sanctioned. Some type of sanctioning might be necessary to
provide the incentives for participation.
A second crucial value is transparency. The processes in order to be legitimate must be visible
and accountable. The sites for deliberation, a crucial element in new governance decision making, should
allow their work to be visible to interested parties. The issues involving access to electronic records raise
important issues, such as the control of valuable social information. The interest in personal health
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records raises interesting questions about the availability of the information and the interaction between
the patient and the health care institutions. The coexistence of the need for flexible public private spaces
and information has to be balanced with the ability to hold the actors accountable for their outcomes. 126
Conclusion
A reform process is underway. The innovations that initiate and facilitate reform are in progress.
These innovations challenge conventional institutions, roles, and professions. They also challenge the way
we participate in society and our view of how government and law can operate. They also reveal that
coexistance of new governance with older governance systems is possible and desirable. One question is
what will be the continuing relationship of the new techniques to the older system. One view is that the
resistance of key actors to change and the inability to demonstrate improved outcomes will roll back these
fledgling innovations. Another view is that the coexistance is stable in many areas and will achieve
success by staying the course. A third view is that coexistance is a transitional stage and more radical
transformation is ahead.
Nonetheless, this is an interesting time to look at health care. It is exciting for those interested in
resolving long-standing health care conundrums. It is also an opportunity to examine the ways governance
and law are changing across many sectors in the United States and internationally.

126

Patti Brennan, Address at the Digital Healthcare Conference (June 9, 2005) (presentation on file with
author).
48

49

